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Kajian ini menyiasat hubungan antara komposisi ahli lembaga dan kecairan 
saham syarikat dengan menggunakan sampel dari negara Asia Timur. Data yang 
dikumpulkan merangkumi 2,407 buah firma-tahun untuk syarikat disenaraikan dalam 
bursa saham di negara China, Hong Kong, Jepun, Malaysia, Singapura, Korea Selatan, 
Taiwan, Thailand, dan Indonesia dari tahun 2003 hingga 2013. Untuk menekankan isu 
endogeniti, kajian ini mengendalikan panel Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 
yang dinamik bagi mengawal endogeniti yang dinamik, heterogeniti yang sukar 
diperhatikan dan keserentakan. Kajian ini menemui bukti yang kukuh bahawa secara 
signifikannya, semakin besar kebebasan lembaga maka semakin tinggi kecairan saham 
dalam syarikat tersebut. Kajian ini mencadangkan bahawa impak kebebasan ahli 
lembaga terhadap kecairan saham dipengaruhi oleh tiga saluran. Saluran-saluran 
tersebut adalah mengenai aliran maklumat daripada pengurus syarikat kepada pihak 
lembaga dan orang awam: (1) Apabila pihak lembaga sedang mempertimbangkan 
penggantian CEO, aliran maklumat daripada CEO kepada lembaga syarikat mungkin 
akan terhalang.  Situasi menjadi semakin teruk apabila lembaga lebih bebas daripada 
CEO. Kajian ini mendapati dalam tempoh pertimbangan penggantian tersebut, pengaruh 
daripada kebebasan ahli lembaga terhadap kecairan saham akan terjejas. (2) Apabila 
xiii  
pembuat pasaran bersedia untuk memproses maklumat secara bebas, kepentingan 
kebebasan lembaga terhadap kecairan saham akan berkurang. (3) Akhirnya, kajian ini 
juga mendapati bahawa apabila terdapat perlindungan yang besar terhadap para pelabur, 
kepentingan penyeliaan lembaga pengurus terhadap kecairan saham berkurang, dan 
seterusnya mengurangkan pengaruh kebebasan ahli lembaga terhadap kecairan saham. 
Keputusan-keputusan kajian ini tidak konsisten dengan tanggapan umum bahawa 
peningkatan penyeliaan daripada lembaga pengarah yang bebas sentiasa membantu 
dalam mengurangkan jurang asimetri maklumat, membaiki keyakinan pembuat pasaran 
dan seterusnya kecairan saham syarikat. Hasil kajian ini menunjukkan bahawa lembaga 
pengarah memberi sumbangan  dengan menasihati dan mendisiplinkan para pengurus 
syarikat. Nasihat dan penyeliaan yang efektif memerlukan kepercayaan dan perkongsian 
maklumat dalam syarikat. Apabila hubungan antara CEO dan lembaga pengarah adalah 
tegang, CEO akan cuba untuk menyekat aliran maklumat yang disampaikan kepada 
pihak lembaga, terutamanya apabila syarikat dikuasai oleh pengarah bebas. Oleh itu, 
kebebasan lembaga mungkin akan menjanakan kos agensi kerana para pengurus 
mempunyai insentif untuk memanipulasi kualiti maklumat yang disampaikan. Kajian ini 
memberikan empirikal bahawa kelebihan relatif untuk kebebasan lembaga perlu 
disyaratkan atas kekuatan perundingan CEO relatif dengan pihak lembaga dan 











This study investigates the relationship between board composition and liquidity 
of a firm’s shares using sample from East Asian countries. The data comprises 2,407 
firm-year observations of listed companies in the stock markets of China, Hong Kong, 
Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and Indonesia over the 
period 2003-2013. To address endogeneity issue, this study conducts a dynamic panel 
generalized method of moments (GMM) to control for dynamic endogeneity, 
unobservable heterogeneity, and simultaneity. The present study finds strong evidence 
that greater board independence significantly increases liquidity.  In this study, the 
impact of board independence on liquidity is suggested to be affected by three channels 
of information flow from managers to the board and the public: (1) when the board is in 
the midst of considering replacing the CEO, the flow of information from the CEO to 
the board may be impeded. This effect clearly can be exacerbated when the board is 
more independent of the CEO, and this study finds that in these periods, the beneficial 
impact of independence on liquidity is impaired; (2) when market makers are better 
equipped to process information independently, the importance of board independence 
on liquidity is reduced; (3) finally, when there are already greater investor protections in 
place that make board supervision of managers less crucial, this will reduce the impact 
of independence board on liquidity. These results are inconsistent with the general 
xivi  
notion that increasing monitoring by an independent board is always helpful in 
mitigating informational asymmetries, and then influence for better market makers’ 
confidence, and ultimately liquidity. The results of this study indicate that boards may 
contribute value by advising as well as disciplining managers, and good advice and 
effective monitoring require a framework of trust and information sharing. When 
relations with their boards are strained, CEOs may actively attempt to suppress the 
information reaching the board, especially when it is dominated by independent 
directors. Therefore, board independence may generate its own agency costs by 
aggravating incentives for managers to manipulate the quality of information. This study 
provides empirical evidence that the relative advantage of board independence must be 
conditioned on both the negotiating strength of the CEO relative to the board as well as 






1.1 Introduction   
Liquidity is generally recognized as a critical attribute of financial assets and is reflected 
in almost all aspects of working within stock markets such as stock price, the cost of 
transaction for trading, investment decision and trading strategy. The literature on 
market microstructure generally refers liquidity in ability to buy and sell assets easily, 
when buyers and sellers trade in and out of position quickly without having a large 
effect on prices (Easley & O’Hara, 2004).  
Liquidity plays a central role in the motivation to trade, enhancing governance, 
reducing cost of capital valuation, and increasing asset return (Amihud & Mendelson, 
1986; Heaton & Lucas, 1996; Brennan & Subrahmanyam, 1996; Brennan et al., 1998; 
Datar et al., 1998; Chordia et al., 2001; Lo et al., 2004). Importantly, a substantial body 
of research also demonstrates that the stock market liquidity contains leading 
information about the real economy, that consider as a particularly strong predictor of 
real GDP growth, unemployment and investment growth (Næs et al., 2011). 
 
1.1.1 Liquidity and Corporate Governance  
Given the essential role of liquidity in stock markets, it has aroused the attention of 
academics to find factors that drive liquidity. Prior research articles show that liquidity 
is affected mostly by several factors such as stock return’s variation (Hameed et al., 
2010), informational environment (Glosten & Milgrom, 1985; Amihud & Mendelson, 
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1986; Diamond & Verrecchia, 1991; Kim & Verrecchia, 1994; Easley & O’Hara, 2004), 
analyst following (Roulstone, 2003), trading algorithm  (Hendershott et al., 2011), CEO 
compensation and some more other factors. Meanwhile, a substantial body of research 
argues that effective corporate governance is the main factor to explain the variation in 
stock liquidity (Chung et al., 2010; Chen et al., 2007; Jain et al., 2008). Corporate 
governance refers to the set of mechanisms that influence the decisions made by 
managers when there is a separation of ownership and control. An effective corporate 
governance system should align the interest of the managers with outsiders and curb 
opportunistic behavior that places a wedge between the interests of the outsiders and 
managers. Existing research studies believe that good corporate governance improve the 
firm’s compliance with the disclosure requirements which in turn will enhance the 
quality and the frequency of information released by management (Forker, 1992). It also 
can increase the reliability of financial activities and the integrity of the financial 
reporting process (Watts & Zimmerman, 1986; Klein, 2002). Therefore, the 
stakeholders use corporate governance to ensure that they will get a return on their 
investments and activities with the company (Kanagaretnam et al., 2007). Otherwise, 
when the company reveals poor corporate governance, outsiders will take action to 
protect their prices for potential losses from investing in this type of company (Chung et 
al., 2010). They may tend to leave investing in the company or may increase their 
compensation as a reaction to the poor corporate governance. Therefore, we can expect 
that the poor corporate governance may influence for worse, the information 
environment, the confidence for trading, and ultimately liquidity. 
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1.1.2 Corporate Governance and Board of Directors 
Board of directors is considered as the apex element of corporate governance among 
other elements such as ownership, competition for corporate control, law and regulation, 
and others (Gillan, 2006). The board of directors is responsible for evaluating CEO 
activities (Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Baysinger & Butler, 1985; Shleifer 
&Vishny, 1997; Coles et al., 2008; Linck et al., 2008) and is an approach to ensure that 
CEO activities are in line with the interest of shareholders (Kanagaretnam et al., 2007). 
The board of directors is meant to perform the critical functions of monitoring and 
advising CEO. Broadly speaking, the monitoring function requires directors to 
scrutinize CEO to guard against harmful behavior, ranging from shirking to fraud. The 
board’s advising function involves helping CEO make good decisions about firm 
strategy and actions. Conventional wisdom suggests that the optimal design of the board 
should be able to improve governance through enhancing both the monitoring role of the 
board and advising role of the board (Linck et al., 2008; Adams & Ferreira, 2007; 
Raheja, 2005). In the meantime, East Asian stock markets have legislated regulation 
reforms on increasing the representation of independent directors on boards. Policy 
makers in this area believe that the increase of independent directors is a critical way to 
avoid another potential financial crisis as well as restore market participants’ confidence 
in stock markets after crisis and scandals. Relatively, Lin (2013) indicates that the 
increase of independent director in companies is a popular regulatory measure in Asia 
after the crisis. In addition, academic researchers have started paying attention to the 
monitoring role of the board as a means of improving corporate governance. For 
example, Google Scholar returned more than 1000 hits using ‘independent board and 
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independent directors’ as part of the title in the period from 1999 to November 2015 
relative to before 1999 that is only 55 hits.  
A key argument supports the changes in board structure, independent boards are 
strong and more effective at monitoring managers. It could presumably restore 
stakeholder confidence (Jain & Rezaee, 2006; Jain et al., 2008; Li, Pincus & Rego, 
2008). However, board independence comes with its own challenges to do his duty. 
Good advice and effective monitoring require a framework of trust and information 
sharing. Boards monitor the CEO, who dislikes monitoring. CEOs may be particularly 
reluctant to share information with their boards. This limitation severely hinders the 
ability of even highly talented board members to contribute effectively to the monitoring 
of the CEO and the company’s strategy (Jensen, 1993). In addition, the independent 
directors’ advisory role depends critically on the information provided by the CEO 
(Song & Thakor, 2006; Adams & Ferreira, 2007), this may result in poor advising. 
Therefore, as with almost everything; independent board comes with benefits and costs 
(Adams & Ferreira, 2009). Nevertheless, the view that strong boards by more 
independent directors could be undesirable is almost never questioned. One of the key 
points we raise in this study, building on the above argument, is that if more 
independent boards in firms are optimal board structure, why countries have regulations 
for increasing the number of independent directors on boards? We expect that 
shareholders have already sought all available ways to maximize their economic self-
interest, whether it is still necessary that regulators push shareholders to choose a special 
level of independent directors on board? 
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1.1.3 Liquidity and Market Maker’s Confidence 
The emphasis on market maker’s confidence is motivated by microstructure theory, 
which, consider market maker as a supplier of liquidity (Grossman & Miller, 1988; 
Coughenour & Saad, 2004; Jain et al., 2008; Comerton-Forde et al., 2010; Glosten & 
Milgrom, 1985; Kim & Verrecchia, 1994; Almer, Gramling & Kaplan, 2008). Market 
makers refer to intermediaries who provide liquidity by using their own account to take 
the role of counterparty for submitted market orders. The view of the role of the market 
maker extends the conventional modeling of liquidity as a response to asymmetric 
information. Existing research studies show that market makers and other traders are 
less willing to supply liquidity when exposed to adverse information events. For 
example, evidences in Doukas et al. (2004), and Doukas and McKnight (2005) imply 
that uncertainty among market makers can affect liquidity. Coughenour and Saad (2004) 
showed that the liquidity provided by market makers depends on the risk of providing it. 
Inventory risk of market makers is reduced when there is less risk of adverse 
information shocks. Comerton-Forde et al. (2010) found that liquidity can worsen when 
market makers lose money from adverse information events. Market makers will be 
more willing to trade a stock with lower price concessions if there is less risk that their 
counterparties have access to privileged information. To sum up, adverse information 
events raise uncertainty among market makers about the value of companies; it would 
turn to rises trading expected returns (Fleming & Remolona, 1999). Liquidity will be 
greater when information events are less likely to happen, and liquidity dry-ups occur 
when market makers expect higher compensation from providing liquidity for facing 
high adverse information events. 
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 Therefore, the focus is on market maker confidence, which may in turn be a 
function of governance arrangements. In corporate governance context, if compliance 
consequence of board structure involves the low level of information events, it will 
reflect to increase market maker’s willingness for providing liquidity as market makers 
face a less risk of trading losses (Jain et al., 2008; Duchin et al., 2010; Adams & 
Ferreira, 2009). Likewise, if cost compliance of board structure exceeds its benefit, 
market makers are less likely to make more favorable inventory decisions by relying on 
board duties. This suggests an important role for board structure information in 
explaining liquidity.  
 
1.1.4 Independent Board and Liquidity 
As it was discussed, the board may enhance liquidity if it improves the trading 
environment for a stock, for example, by greater disclosure and greater certainty about 
the intrinsic value of the firm. Although governance activists have been strong 
proponents of having more independent directors on boards, however, the relation 
between independent board and liquidity theoretically is not clear, and there is little 
definitive evidence on the link between stock market liquidity and board characteristics 
such as independence.  
  One of the key points we can raise in this area of study is that an independent 
board should be viewed as a two-edged sword: increasing monitoring by an independent 
board may be helpful in mitigating informational asymmetries through demand 
additional number of disclosing information; but it can also generate its own agency 
costs by aggravating incentives for managers to affect the quality of information. This 
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point builds on the two groups of studies that have investigated the effect of independent 
board on the informational environment. Fama and Jensen (1983), Adams and Ferreira 
(2007), Kanagaretnam et al. (2007), Ajinkya et al. (2005), and Armstrong et al. (2014) 
are the main advocates of group of the study, noted that a greater level of board 
independence raises the number of voluntary disclosures. They believe that independent 
directors, as outsiders to the firm, demand a substantial amount of firm-specific 
information to effectively perform their advising and monitoring duties. While insider 
directors recognized as active traders in their company’s stock earn substantial abnormal 
returns (Mishra, 2011; Chung & Charenwong, 1998), implying that heavy inside 
representation does in fact impose trading costs on less informed outsiders through a 
less number of disclosing information. Therefore, independent director domination of 
the board may enhance the number of disclosing information. 
While another group of the study suggests that board independence may also 
entail costs (Adams & Ferreira, 2007; Charoenwong et al., 2011; Hermalin & Weisbach, 
2012). These studies argue that the content of information is under CEO’s control; and 
the CEO has fundamentally incentive to manipulate information to achieve stable 
position. The CEO is likely to wield a stronger influence over the board’s decision on 
his replacement, for example, show that the current situation of the firm is adequately 
given disclosing information (Hermalin & Weisbach, 2012; Adams & Ferreira, 2007). 
When directors are outsiders, it is presumably a greater threat for CEO career. Thus, the 
incentive to manipulate of disclosure is stronger for information can be used for 
disciplining purposes. Moreover, independent directors typically have comparatively 
smaller equity stakes in firms they monitor, and so may lack strong financial incentives 
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to carefully act as agents of shareholders, uncovering the fact of information (Guo & 
Masulis, 2012). Existing research studies believe that the CEO attempts to withhold 
information or to otherwise resist efforts by boards to increase transparency have two 
more side consequences. First, reduce information sharing between managers and 
boards may cause a break in communication between CEOs and directors (Adams & 
Ferreira, 2009). CEO will lose the expertise of board members that might otherwise be 
available. Second, it may also erode the strength and speed of deliberation and decision-
making. Faleye et al. (2011) noted that if independent directors are viewed with greater 
suspicion, decision-making may be slower and less cooperative.  
This study employs interaction variables to investigate how the impact of board 
independence on stock market liquidity varies with several other governance variables, 
specifically, CEO career risk, and legal protections already in place. The goal is to test 
whether these variables interact the impact of the CEO-independent board relation and 
ultimately the information environment in which shares are traded. Based upon above 
arguments, one would expect that the relative benefits and costs of increasing board 
independence may well vary across firms and over time as the circumstances of the firm 
change. Therefore, the empirical analysis examines both the average effect of 
independent directors on stock market liquidity as well as the interacting effect of other 
variables on the impact of board independence. In particular, the present study asks 
whether market makers believe that more independent boards are viewed as a mitigating 
information risk, whether their trading behavior responds to board composition, and 
whether other variables may affect the relation between board composition and 
liquidity.  
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This study has argued that other factors can interact the baseline impact of board 
independence. While board independence can affect stock market liquidity through 
these general information channels concerning the transparency of the firm, it can also 
have a more direct effect through the impact of information on market makers. Market 
makers receive compensation for providing liquidity, but in the process bear trading 
risks. A market maker trades off a compensation wide enough to offset the trading 
losses, but narrow enough to attract an adequate number of liquidity-motivated 
transactions. As the market microstructure literature emphasizes, that tradeoff and the 
liquidity that market makers will provide depend on both information availability and 
asymmetry (e.g., Garman, 1976; Stoll, 1978; Ho & Stoll, 1981; O’Hara & Oldfield, 
1986; Chordia et al., 2000; Hasbrouck & Seppi, 2001; Coughenour & Saad, 2004; 
Comerton-Forde et al., 2010).  One would expect to observe meaningful variation across 
market makers in the ability to ferret out relevant information rather than relying solely 
or even primarily on firm disclosures. Griffin and Tversky (1992) also suggest that some 
biases commonly arise as functions of the characteristics of the information used by 
individual decision makers to update their expectations. Thus, professional decision 
makers are unlikely to overreact to the extremity of information, and underreact to 
reliability and more abstract information. This study uses the stock inventory of two 
active market makers in East Asia (Barclays Capital and Goldman Sachs) that have been 
cited as demonstrating particularly professional performance by the NYSE. They are 
recognized as biggest market maker companies all over the world with huge revenue 
from their trading. Goldman Sachs and Barclays have a strong reputation across the 
market maker companies to use sophisticated algorithm trading that is conducted by 
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complex computer programs and big data programming. Existing evidence claim that 
these programs determine various aspects of a trade, which include critical decisions 
like timing, trends and prices in the market and the all the factors associated with these 
factors that can either affect them positively or negatively (Viljoen et al., 2014).  
  This study will consider proxies for the differential abilities of market makers to 
value firms independently and estimate how that ability affects the net benefit of other 
governance arrangements. In actuality, every particular information is inferred by other 
available informative signals. When there is conflict among available information, 
decision makers don’t rely on it. High-quality market makers better equipped to process 
information about the firm. Therefore, they are better able to assess the quality of the 
information the firm releases to the public, and their trading strategies may also allow 
for more sophisticated and effective risk management. It is reasonable to surmise that 
the average this type of market makers to place rely on the quality of information 
relative to the quantity of information when making a decision. The focus of this part of 
the study can answer this question that whether professional market makers share this 
belief that more independent boards are construed as optimal boards? Whether these 
higher-resource firms is less dependent on informational environment that provide by a 
greater level of independent board when assessing their vulnerability to information 
events?  
Another interaction variable is the interaction of CEO turnover that estimate how 
tension within managers a company affects the net benefit of an independent board. 
Independent boards are recognized to be particularly effective in performing specific 
tasks, such as hiring and firing the CEO (Weisbach, 1988; Borokhovich, Parrino & 
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Trapani, 1996), adopting takeover defenses (Brickley, Coles & Terry, 1994), and 
negotiating takeovers (Cotter, Shivdasani & Zenner, 1997) 1  that all of these 
circumstances threaten job security. While to perform the tasks, independent board as an 
outsider to company needs information- information that is often controlled by the very 
CEO it is responsible to evaluate. While CEOs may generally have qualms about 
sharing information with independent directors, these reservations will be greater when 
their jobs are at risk thus puts a natural limit on the board’s ability to effectively monitor 
him. Several research studies emphasize that CEOs may not willingly relinquish control 
to the board and may instead seek to entrench themselves that elicit actions aimed at 
signal distortion. For example, Hermalin and Weisbach (2012) show that when 
managers are concerned about losing employment, they change their investment strategy 
toward myopic behavior to improve reported performance. It is substituting away from 
longer-term investments such as R&D toward shorter-term investments or actions that 
affect reported numbers sooner. Charoenwong et al. (2011) argue that when subjected to 
greater scrutiny, CEOs direct their efforts toward increasing their firms’ stock prices by 
managing or massaging information in order to prevent a takeover. To sum up, 
particularly when managers are concerned about their job security, we have noted that 
more independent boards may be more threatening to managers, which can induce 
management to impede the flow of information. In liquidity context, market makers 
would rationally limit trading exposure or demand higher compensation for inventory 
risk in these circumstances, as non-informed investors would be more sensitive to their 
exposure to adverse selection. Therefore, this study examines changes in the impact of 
                                                 1 Kaplan and Minton (2011) show that board-driven turnover rises significantly, increasing from 10.9% during the 1992 to 1999 period to 12.4% in the 2000 to 2007 period of the sample. 
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board independence during periods in which the board is engaged in considerations that 
threaten CEOs job security. The focus of this part of the study can answer this question: 
Whether liquidity in these periods would be particularly impeded and the relation 
between the proportion of independent directors and liquidity varies with proxy for 
CEO’s turnover?  
Finally, the legal environment may potentially affect the impact of board 
independence (Chung et al., 2012). High levels of investor protection may provide a 
substitute for transparency and reduce the importance of independent directors. For 
example, Klapper and Love (2004) show that investor protection is corporate 
governance provisions matter more in countries with weak investor protection. 
However, it is also plausible that legal protections are complementary to board 
independence, aiding boards in information production and dissemination, and thus 
increasing the beneficial impact of independent directors. Moreover, strong external 
protections that restrict executive prerogatives might take the pressure off the board to 
curtail management discretion and therefore remove a source of friction between them 
(Chung et al., 2012; Claessens et al., 2000; Berkowitz et al., 2003; Lombardo & Pagano, 
2006; La Porta et al., 1999). Given that the most of East Asian companies follow other 
corporate governance styles (Jackson & Moerke, 2005) such as the United States 
(Sarbanes-Oxley regulation) that have strong legal and regulatory environments for 
investor protection rights, that is, it is important to ask whether the effectiveness of an 
independent board to promote liquidity provider to trade depends on the degree of 
investor protection provided by the legal system in the firm’s home country?  
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1.2 Motivation and Contribution of the Study 
Regarding above designed questions, this study can cite at least four motivations to 
investigate the relationship between independent board and liquidity in the East Asia 
area. First, the thesis is motivated by inconsistent results found in past research on the 
relationship between corporate governance and liquidity. The inconsistent result comes 
at a time when recent crisis and ongoing corporate governance concerns have made the 
board of directors, the center of policy debate and academic research (Adams et al., 
2010). Second, there has been an ongoing discussion going back at least a decade about 
the proper number of independent directors on boards in East Asia companies. In 
particular, in the wake of the East Asia financial crisis, several countries implemented 
new legislation calling for an increase in the representation of outside directors on 
boards. This study can provide important context for the debate over the costs and 
benefits of regulation emerging from the crisis in East Asia stock markets, especially the 
debate focusing on reform of corporate governance. Third, East Asia stock markets are 
an interesting sample because of the role of liquidity in triggering the East Asian crisis 
of 1997-1998 (O’Hara, 2003; Fernando & Herring, 2003; Coughenour & Saad, 2004). 
Therefore, knowledge of what drives liquidity, and the characterization of its effects, 
will prove to be critical in preventing market crashes through the evaporation of 
liquidity (Persand, 2000). The final motivation of the study is that East Asia markets 
recognize as an ideal setting for the study of liquidity issues. For example, Bekaert et al. 
(2007) noted that liquidity effects in emerging markets turn out to be more acuter than in 
United States stock markets, this is because, in the NYSE market for example, liquidity 
effects can be mitigated by large numbers of trade securities, diversified ownership 
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structures, and combinations of long- and short-term investors. Since, much of the 
research on this topic was conducted in United States stock markets and theories 
surrounding liquidity are formalized in United States stock markets, this suggests that, 
there is a critical gap in the liquidity area to find the best knowledge of what drives 
liquidity exactly. The growing size and great potential of the East Asian stock market 
also warrants a closer look at the liquidity of those markets. This study will fill these 
gaps in this area of study. 
This study also contribute the existing research in at least two important aspects: 
first, in contrast to earlier studies that have relied on asymmetric information theory to 
explain relations surround liquidity area, this study expands a broader stream of research 
(Comerton-Forde et al., 2010; Jain et al., 2008) pertaining to the relation between the 
market maker confidence and market liquidity by showing whether the market makers 
as liquidity providers respond to perceived shifts to a greater level of independent board. 
Therefore, this study will consider professional market makers proxy for the differential 
abilities of market makers to value firms independently and estimate how that ability 
affects the net benefit of other governance arrangements. Second, while prior studies 
focus on monitoring of the board as the main mechanism affecting the information 
environment, we extend that focus to potential negotiations between the board and the 
CEO, arguing that the way a CEO deals with the board may influence, for better or for 
worse, the information environment. Therefore, this study will consider interacting 
variables (CEO turnover and investor protection) that measure the extent of negotiation 
inside companies. Overall, this study would contribute the existing literature to find a 
board structure that uniformly has a better consequence for all firms at all times. 
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1.3 Problem Statement 
Liquidity is a major policy concern in East Asia stock markets. A significant strand of 
research shows that liquidity played a triggering role in the financial crisis 1997- 1998 
(O’Hara, 2003; Fernando & Herring, 2003; Coughenour & Saad, 2004). They believe 
that the simultaneous decline in liquidity across several markets had a contributory 
factor in the East Asian crisis. The report by the Bank for International Settlements 
(1999) also noted that the sharp evaporation of liquidity from stock markets have posed 
a fatal threat to financial stability. The concern in East Asian markets is even stronger 
because the East Asian crisis also impaired the level of liquidity. O’Hara (2003) shows 
that stakeholders have felt uncertainty about the value of companies after the financial 
crisis. This has discourage the number of the investors who are interested to invest in a 
stock market and shifted market participants’ beliefs about the market, which in turn 
exacerbate the functioning of the financial market such as liquidity (Fernando & 
Herring, 2003). Evidence of this liquidity reduction is clearly shown in Figures 1.1, 
which illustrates the trend of turnover ratio as market liquidity measurement2 during 
crisis period from 1997 to 1998. The trend indicates that the total value of shares traded 
scaled by the average of market capitalization is reduced during the crisis period.  




Liquidity, Turnover Ratio, During Crisis Period 
Source: World Bank (2015)  
The Asian corporate governance mechanisms also were criticized as being 
relatively inefficient in maintaining fairness and integrity in the stock markets during the 
East Asian crisis (Stiglitz, 1998; Harvey & Roper, 1999; Greenspan, 1999). Therefore, 
seeking to better corporate governance levels as well as introducing requirements for 
corporate governance is increasingly important for restoring the confidence of market 
participant on the fairness and integrity in the East Asia stock markets. The policy 
makers for corporate governance practices in the developed and developing countries 



































corporate scandals and crises. 3  Following regulations and recommendations in 
developed western stock markets for having a greater level of board independence,4 the 
most of East Asian stock markets started paying attention to have independent board, 
and implemented new legislation calling for an increase in the representation of 
independent directors on boards in the last decade. Lin (2013) noted that this is a 
popular regulatory reform in Asia after the crisis. Therefore, the percentage of 
independent director on board exogenously increases after regulation reforms. While 
East Asian stock markets have experienced a greater level of independent board, the 
amount of turnover ratio has been stopped moving forward. As can be seen from Figure 
1-2, the average annual turnover ratio on a Malaysian stock market decreases from 44.3 
to 32.7 comparing the pre-1997 crisis period (from 1989 to 1996) to after-reform period 
(from 2001 to 2014). Similarly, China experienced significant deterioration in market 
liquidity after the regulation reform. Indonesia, Hong Kong, and Thailand also share 
similar changes comparing pre-crisis period with post-reform period. Given the 
significant increase in turnover ratio in developed western countries during this time 
period, including in the United States and the United Kingdom5; it reveals that there 
seems to be a threat on liquidity in the majority of East Asian countries. 





 The Average of Annual Turnover Ratio, Liquidity Measurement, Before the East Asian Crisis 97-98 and after the regulation reform 
Source: World Bank (2015)  
There are at least three problems related to the regulation reforms for increasing 
independent directors on the corporate boards in the East Asia firms that deserve further 
attention. First, prior studies believe that the effectiveness of corporate governance 
depends upon the existing business environment in which the firm operates (Chung et 
al., 2012; La Porta et al., 1999).  While the East Asian Codes of Corporate Governance 
is based on the Anglo-Saxon on codes of governance (Jackson & Moerke, 2005; 
Roszaini & Mohamad, 2006). Anglo-Saxon codes set the base for Sarbanes-Oxley act in 
the United States where companies have strong legal and regulatory environments, but 
whether the Anglo-Saxon code is appropriate to induce better economy prosperity and 
firm performance for Asian businesses remain an open question to be observed. Second, 













The Average ofTurnover Ratio 8 Yearsbefore Crisis 97-98
The Average ofTurnover Ratio afterRegulation Reform
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independent directors on corporate boards. This is also a contentious issue for financial 
accounting literature (Morck, 2008).  Policy makers in this area stipulate different 
minimum levels for the representation of independent directors on boards and involve it 
in different time. For example, Korea adopted governance rules, effective partly in 2000 
and fully in 2001, which require large firms to have 50% outside directors, but small 
firms must have 25% outside directors (Black & Kim, 2012). In 2001, Kuala Lumpur 
stock exchange requires the board of directors of all listed companies to consist of one-
third of independent directors or at least two directors. Taiwanese public firms had to 
appoint at least two independent directors in 2007 (Chang & Wei, 2011). While 
Japanese policy makers require only one independent director as a minimum in 20096. 
Therefore, there is a need to investigate the debate over the costs and benefits of the 
regulations that emerged from the crisis. Third, empirical research reveals evidence 
related to notable upward trend in CEO turnover over the world after regulatory bodies 
require a majority of independent directors on boards (Kaplan & Minton, 2012; 
Hermalin & Weisbach, 2012). CEO turnover entails costs that are considered as the dark 
side of independent board (Hermalin & Weisbach, 2012). Compelling evidence to 
support the conventional wisdom about the dark side of independent board is still 
limited, it is therefore a puzzle that the present study trying to gauge. 
To sum up, stock markets in East Asia are an interesting sample both because of 
the role of liquidity in the East Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998 (O’Hara, 2003; 
Fernando and Herring, 2003; Coughenour and Saad, 2004) and because of the 
regulatory response it elicited on the governance reforms. Based on observations on 
                                                 6 See Table2-1 for more details about the progress of adoption of independent directors on board in East Asia Countries 
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liquidity and the scenario surrounding corporate governance reforms in the East Asian 
stock markets, there is a need for further academic address on the relation between 
independent board and liquidity. 
 
1.4 Objective of the Study 
The theoretical literature points to the costs and benefits of having more independent 
directors on the board. To sum up, researchers classify board’s activities into two major 
functions: monitoring and advising (Linck et al., 2008; Adams & Ferreira, 2007; Raheja, 
2005). By increasing independent directors on the board, the board’s principal role 
shifted from the “advising board” to the “monitoring board”. Increase in monitoring 
provides benefits, but it also entails costs. Benefit: having a better ability to monitor 
CEO would result in encouraging CEO to disclose more information to outside investors 
and limit managerial opportunism. Cost: the increasing monitoring gives CEO 
incentives to engage in value reducing activities intended to make himself appear more 
capable (Hermalin & Weisbach, 2011). As noted by Holmstrom (2005), Adams and 
Ferreira (2009), and others, if managements believe that a more independent board will 
monitor more intensively, they may be reluctant to disclose credible information that 
can be used for disciplining purposes. The board’s structure may influence, for better or 
for worse, the information environment, market makers’ confidence, and ultimately 
liquidity. 
While theoretical and empirical evidence emphasize the positive consequences 
of independent board in times of corporate scandals and financial crises (Adams & 
Ferreira, 2009) but compelling evidence to support the benefits of a greater level of 
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independent board in times of normalcy is limited yet. The compliance cost of an 
independent board may exceed its benefits at normal time, and then liquidity might 
actually worsen. Therefore, the present study would like to fill up the gap of this 
academic research in this area since there has been little evidence about cost and benefit 
independent board in the present of professional market makers, CEO turnover time, 
and weak investor protection. It would be surprising, therefore, to find a board structure 
that uniformly has better consequence for all firms at all times. 
In the view of issues discussed above, the following research objectives would 
be worthy of investigation. 
 
1) To investigate the relationship between the proportion of independent directors 
and stock liquidity. 
 
2) To examine whether the professional market maker interacts the relationship 
between the proportion of independent directors and liquidity. 
 
3) To examine whether the CEO turnover interacts the relationship between the 
proportion of independent directors and liquidity. 
 
4) To examine whether the investor protection interacts the relationship between 




1.5 Research Questions 
This study will try to answer the following research questions: 
1. What is the relationship between the proportion of independent directors and 
stock liquidity? 
 
2. What is the role of professional market makers in the relationship between the 
proportion of independent directors and liquidity? 
 
3. What is the role of CEO turnover in the relationship between the proportion of 
independent directors and liquidity? 
 
4. What is the role of investor protection in the relationship between the proportion 
of independent directors and liquidity? 
  
1.6 Significance of the Study 
This study focuses on variation in board structure and liquidity across a sample of East 
Asian firms. Identifying the factors drive liquidity has been an ongoing discussion going 
back at least three decades. The results of this study shed further light on relations 
surrounding liquidity. The findings will also provide important context for the debate 
over the costs and benefits of regulation emerging from the crisis in East Asia stock 
markets, especially the debate focusing on reform of corporate governance. In 
particular, this study will offer explanation whether well-equipped market makers 
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consider high independent board as an important factor to adjust their trading risk. This 
study will add to the literature whether the tension among managers is the dark side of a 
greater level of independent board, which liquidity in these periods would be 
particularly impeded. Further, this study will also extend literature that whether 
independent boards work in combination with investor protection at the county level or 
there may be substituted relation between them. The following subsections present more 
details about the significance of this study. 
 
1.6.1 Significance of the Study for Academic Research    
The study extends the corporate governance literature by providing evidence that 
liquidity would be adjusted in a greater level of independent board. This study also can 
answer to some scholarly studies that found no statistically significant (or negative) 
relationship between board independence and liquidity. This study employs interaction 
terms that measure market makers quality and the extent of tension to make a deep 
analysis of the relation between independent board and stock liquidity. The findings will 
suggest that negotiations may better align the interest of the CEO with outsiders or may 
generate higher tension within the company that places a wedge between the interests of 
the CEO and outsiders. The present study will add to the literature that the net benefit of 
board independence may depend on conditions such as the negotiating strength of the 
board versus the manager, and other investor protections already in place. Focusing on 
above relations is also important for existing literature because it could shed some light 
on the channel through which effective board affects shareholder wealth.  
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1.6.2 Significance of the Study for Policy Makers  
The evidence of this study forms an important consideration in the debate on the costs 
and benefits of the recent regulation in the East Asian countries. The findings of study 
complement calls in the contemporaneous accounting and finance literature for 
companies to consider the optimal design of corporate governance, which improves 
stock liquidity through effective board, and then attract more investors to participate in 
the stock market. As it was discussed, liquidity is widely considered as a major policy 
concern in East Asian markets. This study will present new feedbacks on the relation 
board-liquidity that help to make better decisions by policy makers in both companies 
and stock markets, for whom corporate governance for better liquidity are an option. 
This study also helps to explain the differences in the observed liquidity level across the 
countries by focusing on independent board in nine East Asia markets. 
 
1.6.3 Significance of the Study for Investors 
Market participants, especially foreign institutional investors fear to invest in emerging 
market because of liquidity concern (Lesmond, 2005; Chuhan, 1994). Understanding the 
source of liquidity movements is important for market participants, because, this 
understanding will help investors bear this risk with greater efficiency (Lesmond, 2005). 
This study highlight factors that drive liquidity in East Asian markets. Understanding 
about the factors that drive liquidity will help market participants to decide on their 
liquidity exposures and the rewards they would require. From investor perspectives, a 
better perception of the dynamics of liquidity both within and across markets could help 
investors to design better trading strategies. From market maker perspectives, they will 
